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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-2207 
___________ 
CONROY KIM CLAYTON, 
   Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                  Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A043-976-512) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Walter A. Durling 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 26, 2018 
Before:  KRAUSE, SCIRICA, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed October 26, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Conroy Kim Clayton petitions this Court for review of a final removal order 
entered by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed a decision by the  
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to reject Clayton’s claim that he has derivative United States 
citizenship through his father.  We too must reject Clayton’s claim to derivative 
citizenship, and we will deny his petition for review. 
Clayton, a native and citizen of Jamaica, was admitted to the United States 
(“U.S.”) as a lawful permanent resident on May 27, 1993.  He was convicted on July 29, 
2011, of conspiracy to commit robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and brandishing 
a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A)(ii).  Clayton was sentenced to a total of 108 months imprisonment.  In a 
Notice to Appear issued on April 7, 2015, the Department of Homeland Security charged 
Clayton with being removable as having been convicted of an aggravated felony as 
defined by INA § 101(a)(43)(F), crime of violence; § 101(a)(43)(G), a theft or burglary 
offence; and § 101(a)(43)(U), relating to attempt or conspiracy.  He was also charged as 
removable under § 237(a)(2)(C), as an alien convicted under any law of purchasing, 
selling, offering for sale, exchanging, using, owning, possessing, or carrying any weapon 
or accessory which is a firearm or destructive device as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a).  At 
his master calendar hearing on August 8, 2017, the IJ sustained all charges except for the 
aggravated felony as defined in § 101(a)(43)(F) (crime of violence). 
 Clayton testified at the hearing that he believed he was not removable because he 
had derived U.S. citizenship from his citizen father under former INA § 321, 8 U.S.C. § 
1432(a), which confers citizenship to children born outside of the U.S. when one or more 
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parent naturalizes and certain other statutory conditions are met.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a); 
Morgan v. Att’y Gen., 432 F.3d 226, 230 n.1 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services had issued a Notice of Denial on April 9, 2014, 
finding that Clayton failed to meet his burden of proof on the derivative citizenship 
claim.  His appeal to the Administrative Appeals Office was dismissed on October 27, 
2014.  Given this adverse determination, Clayton asked the immigration court to make its 
own finding regarding his citizenship claim. 
 In an Interim Ruling issued on September 19, 2017, the IJ concluded that Clayton 
failed to establish that he derived citizenship under INA § 321.  The IJ noted that, 
because Clayton reached the age of eighteen in December 1998, over two years prior to 
the effective date of the Child Citizenship Act of 2000 (“CCA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1431, his 
claim is governed by former § 321.  The IJ went on to conclude that Clayton failed to:  
(1) present evidence that his biological parents were married and later legally separated; 
(2) establish the citizenship of both his mother and father before his eighteenth birthday; 
(3) present evidence that his mother became deceased prior to his eighteenth birthday; or 
(4) that his step-mother ever legally adopted him.  In light of the Interim Ruling on 
Clayton’s citizenship claim, the IJ subsequently issued an Oral Decision on October 24, 
2017, ordering him removed to Jamaica. 
 Clayton timely sought review before the BIA.  In a decision issued on February 
23, 2018, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s determination that Clayton did not gain derivative 
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citizenship under former § 321(a) for the reasons noted by the IJ.  Additionally, the BIA 
rejected Clayton’s argument that he derived citizenship because, though born out of 
wedlock, he is considered legitimated under the Jamaican Status of Children Act.  The 
BIA concluded that legitimation was not at issue because Clayton’s mother did not 
naturalize.  Finally, the BIA determined that Clayton did not gain derivative citizenship 
through his father under the provisions of the CCA because Clayton was over the age of 
eighteen on February 27, 2001 (the effective date of the CCA), and the CCA has no 
retroactive effect.  The BIA thus dismissed Clayton’s appeal. 
 Because Clayton’s removability is based on his having committed an aggravated 
felony, our jurisdiction over his petition is limited to questions of law and constitutional 
claims.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  We have jurisdiction to review the citizenship 
claim, and because the facts underlying Clayton’s claim are not in dispute, we can decide 
his claim as a matter of law.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(5)(A).  “We exercise plenary review 
over [a] derivative citizenship claim, as it presents a pure question of statutory 
interpretation.”  Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 328 (3d Cir. 2005).  “The burden of 
proof of eligibility for citizenship is on the applicant,” and “[a]ll doubts should be 
resolved in favor of the United States and against the claimant.”  Bagot v. Ashcroft, 398 
F.3d 252, 256-57 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). 
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Former INA § 321(a) generally provided for derivative citizenship of alien 
children upon their alien parents’ naturalization if certain statutory conditions were met.1  
Morgan, 432 F.3d at 229-30.  This statute was in effect when Clayton was born in 1980, 
when he entered the U.S. in 1993, and when his father naturalized in 1997; it thus 
controls his claim for derivative citizenship.  Id. at 230.2  For Clayton to be a derivative 
citizen under this provision, he must satisfy one of the three avenues to citizenship 
specified in subsections (1), (2), and (3).  See Jordon, 424 F.3d at 329. 
                                              
1  Section 321(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1999), provided as follows:  “A child born outside 
of the United States of alien parents, or of an alien parent and a citizen parent who has 
subsequently lost citizenship of the United States, becomes a citizen of the United States 
upon fulfillment of the following conditions: 
 
(1)  The naturalization of both parents; or 
(2)  The naturalization of the surviving parent if one of the parents is deceased; 
or 
(3)  The naturalization of the parent having legal custody of the child when 
there has been a legal separation of the parents or the naturalization of the 
mother if the child was born out of wedlock and the paternity of the child 
has not been established by legitimation; and if 
(4)  Such naturalization takes place while such child is under the age of 
eighteen years; and 
(5)  Such child is residing in the United States pursuant to a lawful admission 
for permanent residence at the time of the naturalization of the parent last 
naturalized under clause (1) of this subsection, or the parent naturalized 
under clause (2) or (3) of this subsection, or thereafter begins to reside 
permanently in the United States while under the age of eighteen years.” 
 
2  Section 321(a) was repealed by the CCA, which took effect on February 27, 2001.  The 
CCA liberalized the conditions for derivative citizenship of alien children of naturalized 
parents, but it is not retroactive and does not apply to individuals like Clayton who turned 
eighteen before it went into effect.  Morgan, 432 F.3d at 230 n.1. 
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First and foremost, Clayton cannot establish – under subsection (1) – that both of 
his parents were naturalized when he was a child.  There is no question that Clayton’s 
mother was never naturalized.  Likewise, since Clayton’s non-naturalized mother was 
alive until after he reached the age of eighteen, he cannot satisfy subsection (2) (which 
requires that a child’s surviving parent be naturalized).  Clayton’s claim fails under 
§ 321(a)(3) as well.  He offered no evidence that his parents ever married and, in fact, 
claimed at one point that he was born out of wedlock.  See A.R. at 23.  Thus, as the BIA 
concluded, “there was no legal separation and conveyance of legal custody to the father” 
prior to the time of his father’s naturalization.  See id. at 3; see also Morgan, 432 F.3d at 
234 (holding that “a legal separation for purposes of § 1432(a) occurs only upon a formal 
government action”); Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that alien “does not enjoy derivative citizenship under the first clause of 
§ 321(a)(3) because his natural parents never married and thus could not legally 
separate”).  Additionally, because his mother never naturalized, the BIA is correct in its 
conclusion that the issue of legitimation is not relevant.  As such, Clayton cannot satisfy 
the third and final avenue to derivative citizenship. 
 Moreover, there is no merit to Clayton’s argument that he does not need to satisfy 
any of former § 321(a)’s three avenues to derivative citizenship because the CCA 
provides for derivative citizenship when only one parent becomes a U.S. citizen.  The 
BIA has rejected this position, see In re Rodriguez-Tejedor, 23 I. & N. Dec. 153, 163 
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(BIA 2001), as has this Court.  See Morgan, 432 F.3d at 230 n.1 (“The law, however, 
does not apply retroactively to persons, like petitioner, who turned eighteen before 
Congress passed the Child Citizenship Act.”). 
 On this record, the claim to derivative citizenship under former § 321(a)(3) was 
properly denied.  See Jordon, 424 F.3d at 330.  We have considered Clayton’s remaining 
contentions but find them without merit.  For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the 
petition for review. 
